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LEXICAL COMPETENCE AND FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSE GRAMMAR
Daniel GARCÍA VELASCO1
• ABSTRACT: This article discusses the role of the lexicon component within Functional
Discourse Grammar. It argues that the treatment of lexical meaning in most grammatical
models is not adequate and proposes an alternative analysis based on Marconi’s (1997)
notion of lexical competence, according to which lexical meaning comprises two different
dimensions: referential and inferential lexical knowledge. It is further claimed that
decompositional models of lexical meaning do not really capture speakers’ inferential
knowledge, as it is doubtful that they possess detailed and similar definitions for most
lexical items. It is claimed that speakers associate beliefs and specifications with lexical
items and that communication emerges when those beliefs converge dynamically in verbal
interaction. Finally, the implications of this analysis for FDG are examined. It is suggested
that abstract meaning definitions are not really needed in the model and that the lexicon
should be in close contact with the conceptual component.
• KEYWORDS: Functional Discourse Grammar; lexical competence; lexicon; conceptual
component.
1 Introduction
Although it is true that most contemporary grammatical theories grant the
lexicon a prominent role in the generation of linguistic expressions, it is equally
true that this component has usually been seen as a mere repository of lexemes,
morphological rules and lexical irregularities. At most, authors have devised
lexical decomposition systems which, apart from characterizing lexical meaning
by means of a limited number of primitive relations, have also been employed to
establish systematic links between the lexicon and syntax. This strategy may
seem adequate to those who see language as a self-contained autonomous entity
(roughly contemporary formal linguistics), but it seems less so from a functionalist
point of view, as the role of the lexicon in the characterization of speakers’
communicative competence (Functional Grammar’s ultimate goal) cannot be
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that exiguous. Apart from minor implementation differences, however, this has
also been the characterization of the lexicon component in classical Functional
Grammar (FG, DIK, 1997) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG, HENGEVELD,
2004; HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE, 2006).
The aim of this article is to lay out the aspects of the lexicon component
which are necessary in a functional characterization of communicative
competence and to examine the implications for FDG. Consequently, the lexicon
will be examined from the point of view of the natural language user and not
from a grammar-designing perspective, as has been usually the case in
contemporary linguistics. The article is divided in two main sections. The first
one will deal with the notion lexical competence and will try to characterize the
semantic content of lexical items and its relation to the conceptual component.
The second section will deal with the implications for the lexicon in the FDG
model. Given the complexity of the issues involved, which have vexed
philosophers of language for many years, and the obvious restrictions of available
space, the conclusions of this paper will necessarily be partial and mostly
programmatic and the characterization of the different positions in the semantic
arena may be too simplistic at times. However, it is to be expected that it will
serve to illuminate directions of future research for FDG in the lexicon component,
about which the model has had little to say so far.
2 On lexical competence
Dik (1997, p.5-6) claims that the psychological correlate of a natural language
is the notion of communicative competence as introduced by Hymes (1972). He
explicitly states that communicative competence comprises “not only the ability
to construe and interpret linguistic expressions, but also the ability to use these
expressions in appropriate and effective ways according to the conventions of
verbal interaction prevailing in a linguistic community”. It seems natural to
suppose that lexical competence, which could accordingly be defined as the
ability to use words in appropriate and effective ways in verbal interaction, is
part of communicative competence as defined above. However, in current
linguistic theory there has been an unfortunate tendency to concentrate on the
meticulous analysis of lexical meaning in order to account for the structural
properties of lexical items, while ignoring significant aspects of the use and
behaviour of lexemes in linguistic utterances. The reasons behind this strategy
may be the following:
(i) From a purely grammar-designing perspective, all a linguistic model
demands from the lexicon is the basic semantic and syntactic properties of
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lexical items which are necessary to use them in linguistic expressions. This
has been captured in formal theories in standard lexical entries through thematic
relations and predicate-argument structures, and, in FG, through classical
predicate frames. Thus, from the point of view of the grammar system, many
aspects of the meaning of a lexical item are simply irrelevant in the generation
of a linguistic expression. As Jackendoff (1997, p.91) observes, the words in (1a)
are syntactically identical, since the computational system is only sensitive to
their syntactic features; the same is true for the words in (1b), (1c) and (1d):
(1) a. dog, cat, armadillo
b. walk, swim, fly
c. gigantic, slippery, handsome
d. on, in, near
The fact that the word cat denotes an entity significantly different from that
denoted by the item dog is simply irrelevant to the syntactic component, which
only needs to know that both lexical items are nouns or that they pluralize in a
regular fashion.
(ii) The second reason is aptly expressed by Marconi (1997, p.86-87):
Ever since Frege, it has seemed that communication and cultural
inheritance require uniformity of meanings: if ‘cat’ did not mean the
same for me and you, we could not talk to each other about the same
animals; we would forever be equivocating.
If we assume, as it should be obvious to anyone, that members of a linguistic
community generally succeed in communicating verbally with each other, it
follows that they should possess equivalent meanings/definitions for the lexical
items of their language.2 Most approaches to word meaning assume the classical
idea that concepts have definitions, and take standard dictionaries as
authoritative sources which reflect the shared meaning of an item available to
all competent users. In a way, this is responsible for another factor, which is also
cited by Marconi (1997, p.93):
(iii) Individual competences are irrelevant to semantic theories. Objectivistic
truth-theoretic semantic theories consider meanings as public entities, and
individual semantic competences as particular grasps of those objective entities.
However, unlike grammatical knowledge, lexical knowledge is significantly
different across speakers. The meaning associated to a given lexical concept
2 This may well be an oversimplification, as not all models of language assume the uniformity of meanings to
account for inter-human communication. As a matter of fact, it would be convenient to explore in detail the
complex question of what counts as communication, but this is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
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may be fragmentary for some speakers and even totally incorrect for others. For
example, a speaker might foolishly believe that a ‘bicycle’ is a type of animal.
According to the objectivists, this would only show his ignorance of the meaning
or extension of that particular item. No matter what speakers believe, they claim,
meanings are ‘out there‘, and the item ‘bicycle’ only denotes the relevant
artefacts. Consequently, semanticists disregard individual lexical competences
as irrelevant for semantic theory.3
These three assumptions have (implicitly at least) guided most recent work
on lexical semantics, as lexical definitions are taken to be similar across speakers
of the same language (or, at least, they are taken to represent an ideal speaker’s
lexical competence). Moreover, as most current linguistic models are lexically
driven, the study of word meaning has also resulted in a decompositional
modelling of definitions of quite a complex nature in an effort to predict the
syntactic behaviour of lexemes. It is undoubtedly true that the different
decompositional approaches to lexical meaning offer interesting insights into
the nature of lexical knowledge. Indeed, they seem to adequately account for
speakers’ semantic inferences, and relevant patterns in the lexicon of a language
and across languages have been discovered. However, these approaches to word
meaning ignore many aspects of lexical behaviour which are surely necessary
for a full account of language use. Pragmatic, affective, and stylistic features are
obviously associated with lexical items, and all of them are relevant for a proper
understanding of their felicitous use in linguistic expressions (LEVELT, 1989,
p.183; LEECH, 1974, p.10). At the same time, the selection and interpretation of
lexical items may obviously be influenced in crucial ways by contextual factors,
as different authors have already noted (e.g. CRUSE, 1986; PUSTEJOVSKI, 1995;
EVANS, 2006). These are factors which have not taken a prominent position in
most work on lexical semantics in grammar models.
Indeed, as pointed out to me by José Luis G. Escribano (p. c.), this may not
be a real problem as long as one assumes a distinction between linguistic and
pragmatic competence. Communication would thus emerge from the interaction
of both, and all pragmatic aspects of lexical units and contextual meaning
construction could be accounted for in a theory of language use (note that this
is basically Dik’s (1997, p.7) position when he assumes a distinction between
grammatical and communicative competence). In a way this strategy is
understandable in formal linguistic models, in which aspects of linguistic use
can just be swept under the carpet of performance, but, if functional linguistics
aims at explaining not only our ability to generate linguistic expressions but
also how we can produce expressions complying with the rules that govern
3 But note that objectivist semantics is rejected by Dik (1997, p.129) in his account of reference.
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verbal interaction (Dik’s standard of pragmatic adequacy), lexical meaning should
be studied from a different perspective.
A sensible strategy to tackle this problem would require examining in detail
the structure of lexical competence, including all the factors that contribute to
the adequate use of lexical items. Hence, what is needed is a theory of the
lexicon that accounts not only for lexical meaning but also lexical use. As my
starting point, I will take Marconi’s (1997) work on lexical competence. Marconi
(1997, p.2) believes that lexical competence comprises two distinct dimensions
of knowledge: inferential and referential lexical knowledge:
It seemed to me that to be able to use a word is, on the one hand, to
have access to a network of connections between that word and other
words and linguistic expressions: it is to know that cats are animals,
that in order to arrive somewhere, one has to move, that an illness is
something one may be cured of, and so forth. On the other hand, to
be able to use a word is to know how to map lexical items onto the
real world (…) The former ability can be called inferential (…) the
latter may be called referential.
Marconi adduces reasons to justify this distinction. For example, although it is
not a common situation, it may well be the case that a speaker is referentially
competent in the use of a lexical item but inferentially incompetent and vice verse.
That is, the two abilities are, to an important extent, independent of each other.
Marconi illustrates the situation with the bookish zoologist who knows everything
that has to be known about a given type of butterfly but fails to recognize it when
he comes across one. Let us examine these two dimensions in more detail.
2.1 Referential knowledge
Marconi defines referential competence as the ability to map lexical items
onto the world. In principle, one might think that this is not a linguistic ability,
but a cognitive process through which speakers interact with their environment.
However, there are reasons to reject such an interpretation.
(i) The relevance of referential competence very much depends on the
linguistic community which unconsciously agrees on what counts as knowing
the meaning of a lexical item (MARCONI, 1997, p.66). If a speaker cannot tell a
dog from a cat, his linguistic community might safely conclude that he does not
know what a dog is. However, the same linguistic community might agree that
the ability to apply the technical item ‘crankset’ to the right referent is only
available to the expert in the field.
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(ii) On many occasions referential competence may be more prominent than
inferential competence. When one hears the word ‘beer’, ‘dog‘, etc. the first
thing that comes to mind is possibly a mental image of those entities. Only after
considering them in detail might one come up with a characterization of its
meaning.
(iii) Many words within the same semantic field are distinguished by average
speakers only on the basis of mental representations. Jackendoff makes this
very clear in his discussion of the distinction among motion verbs. In particular,
he believes that the differences among verbs with a similar conceptual
representation should be captured in a complex 3D model structure which, he
claims, has no syntactic effects; he says (JACKENDOFF, 1990, p.34):
how is one to distinguish, say, running from jogging from loping, or
throwing from tossing from lobbing? If the lexical entries for these
verbs contain a 3D model representation of the action in question, no
distinction at all need be made in conceptual structure. The first set
of verbs will all simply be treated in conceptual structure as verbs of
locomotion, the second set as verbs of propulsion. (...) Differences
that appear only in 3D model structure can by hypothesis have no
syntactic effects. For example, run, jog and lope are syntactically
parallel, as are throw, toss and lob. Thus the members of each set can
be identical in conceptual structure and differ only in the associated
3D model.
Unfortunately, the structure of referential knowledge has received very little
attention in linguistic theory, certainly as a consequence of its characterization
as non-linguistic perceptual knowledge and of the belief that it is irrelevant in
the syntactic use of a lexical item. At most, authors have simply assumed that
lexical items are attached to mental images (DIK, 1997) or 3D structures
(JACKENDOFF, 1990). Although a discussion of this problem is beyond the scope
of this paper, I will assume that referential knowledge (or ability) is clearly part
of communicative competence and must therefore be accounted for within a
theory of lexical use.
2.2 Inferential knowledge
The orthodox treatment of lexical meaning in FG can be found in Dik’s
(1978) early monograph Stepwise Lexical Decomposition. In this work, the author
states that defining lexical meaning is a “language internal affair” in which
predicates of the object language are employed in the characterization of more
complex predicates. Indeed, Dik’s approach to lexical semantics leaves aside
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non-denotational aspects of meaning, in line with current characterizations of
lexical knowledge, which tend to include in lexical entries those aspects of the
meaning of an item relevant to account for its use in the construction of linguistic
expressions. As mentioned before, this tendency seems a natural strategy in
formal grammatical theories which see a clear dividing line between linguistic
and non-linguistic or general knowledge, but it seems rather unfortunate that it
has also been assumed by some functional theories as FG and, to my knowledge,
FDG. The assumption is, therefore, a classical one: words can be defined and
speakers possess definitions of lexical items. Let us examine these two
hypotheses in more detail.
2.3 Definitions
The assumption that lexical items have definitions is obviously based on
the classical idea that concepts can be defined on the basis of a number of
sufficient and necessary features which determine the possibility of applying
them to the relevant referent. This view has been translated into contemporary
linguistics without much discussion. In the case of formal syntactocentric
theories, the reason seems quite obvious. Constructing a lexical definition for
the computational system is constrained by two basic ideas: first, the definition
should contain everything necessary to interpret the word correctly in a linguistic
expression and, secondly, if one assumes a powerful linking system between
definitions and syntax, then one has to include in the definitions the information
required for the system to operate. The field of lexical semantics offers rather
complex theories of word meaning such as Jackendoff’s (1990) Semantic
Structures or, within the functionalist tradition, the so-called Functional
Lexematic Model (FABER; MAIRAL, 1999). These models search for systematic
relationships among items in the lexicon, as well as principles which predict
the syntactic behaviour of an item on the basis of its meaning. Yet, despite the
complexity of the systems of representation proposed, they are very far from
characterizing speakers’ lexical competence as understood here. Classical FG
does not propose a linking mechanism between the level of Meaning Definition
and Predicate frame,4 but the construction of definitions is based on Carnap’s
notion of meaning postulate, a formal system of representation for necessary
and sufficient features.
There are obvious problems with the classical view on word meaning, some
of which are summarised by Laurence and Margolis (1999) and Rey (1999):
4 In the course of the years, however, a number of such linking mechanisms have been proposed (SCHACK-
RASSMUSSEN, 1994; CORNISH, 2002; GARCÍA VELASCO and HENGEVELD, 2002; BUTLER, Forthcoming)
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(i) Many concepts do not have definitions or, at least, many speakers cannot
produce them in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions. These include
not only grammatical words (sentence connectors, prepositions, articles,
demonstratives, etc.), but also, many other abstract terms: adjectives denoting
properties are notoriously difficult to define and the same applies to many
abstract nouns. The fact that lexicographers can systematically produce
definitions for these items does not of course mean that average speakers can
also produce those definitions. As Quine (1999, p.155) notes, a lexicographer
just reflects people’s “general of preferred usage prior to his own work”. One
might argue, then, that a dictionary definition is the intersection of all individuals’
competences, but that possibility would only be acceptable under an objectivist
semantic theory, for that intersection would exist in nobody’s mental lexicon.5
This means that linguists making use of dictionaries in the construction of lexical
definitions do little more than translating into some formal language those
features they consider essential in the definition of a lexical item, but it is doubtful
that this is a proper characterization of a speaker’s lexical competence.
Of course, the fact that speakers cannot always come up with definitions
for common vocabulary does not mean per se that lexical items appear in the
lexicon devoid of all content, as Fodor (1998) and Sinclair (1996) would have it
(for entirely different reasons!). As pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer,
speakers cannot state the grammatical rules of their language and yet they
obviously have knowledge of them. However, the nature of grammatical
knowledge is significantly different from that of lexical knowledge. All competent
English speakers ‘know‘ that the sequence *house the is ill-formed, but the
same competent speakers may have difficulties in deciding whether an ostrich
is a bird or not, to cite a classical example. The existence of unclear cases such
as these indicates that necessary and sufficient features may not be the stuff
lexical meaning is made of (see also (iii) below).
(ii) Even though most speakers cannot produce necessary features for many
concepts, still they use lexical items efficiently in verbal interaction. Therefore,
having a concept, and that includes lexical concepts, does not necessarily mean
possessing all the necessary features which characterize it. Let us illustrate the
question with a trivial example. I think we can agree that being a mammal is an
essential feature of the concept ‘dog‘. Yet, speakers need not know that dogs
are mammals to be able to refer to them, to identify them, and to use the word
5 This seems to be Allwood’s (2003, p.43) position when he introduces the notion of meaning potential as the
basic unit of word-meaning: “The meaning potential is all the information that the word has been used to
convey either by a single individual or, on the social level, by the language community. The meaning potential,
then, does not result from trying to find a generally valid type meaning for a word. Rather, it is the union of
individually or collectively remembered uses”. It is difficult to see how this proposal could be compatible
with a non-objectivistic approach to semantics.
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in thousands of well-formed linguistic expressions, such as I like your dog, Dogs
are friendly animals or Dogs should be forbidden in parks.
(iii) Prototypicality effects have shown that some elements may be perceived
as better examples of a category than others, a possibility which is unexpected
in the classical theory: if concepts are well defined, all members of a category
should be on a par as long as they satisfy all necessary features. Again, to continue
with another classical example, the Pope is not a likely candidate for bachelor
even though he satisfies all essential features of the expression (i.e. unmarried
& man). Prototypicality effects are difficult to reconcile with the classical view
on lexical meaning.
(iv) If concepts consist of necessary features only, there should be a way to
distinguishing essential from accidental properties. In principle, this was the
job of analytical statements, defined as a priori and unrevisable truths, but this
possibility was rejected after Quine’s attack on the analytic / synthetic distinction
and Wittgestein’s observations on the basis of the concept ‘game‘, which he
used to illustrate the fuzziness of conceptual categories. Carnap introduced
meaning postulates precisely to formalize analycity and it seems therefore
reasonable to assume that the system of lexical decomposition employed in FG,
which is based on meaning postulates, also tries to account for necessary
conditions only.
Clearly, all this implies that a characterization of lexical competence should
rely on different principles.6 Given the difficulty in dividing linguistic from
enclyclopaedic knowledge, proponents of Cognitive Grammar claim that
encyclopaedic specifications should be seen as part of the meaning of lexical
items (LANGACKER, 1987, p.154). The basic idea is that lexical items, or linguistic
expressions, for that matter, are points of access to different bodies of knowledge
against which we can make sense of them. Langacker believes that the part of
the meaning of a lexical item which can be called conventional is simply
contextual (roughly encyclopaedic) knowledge which has been established “as
conventional through repeated occurrence” (LANGACKER, 1987, p.158). The
question is then, how is that conventional meaning established?
As it is not reasonable to assume that speakers invoke all their knowledge
about a concept to interpret an expression, Langacker (1987, p.159) agrees that
some aspects of the meaning of a lexical item are more central than others.
6 A radical alternative approach is offered in the work of Jerry A. Fodor (FODOR, 1998; FODOR and LEPORE
1998). In Fodor and Lepore’s (1998, p.270) review of Pustejovski (1995), we read “We propose to adopt a
version of this claim as a sort of null hypothesis: namely, that the only thing a lexical entry specifies is the
denotation of the item it describes. Here again we scant the details for the moment. Roughly, though: the
lexical entry for dog says that it refers to ‘dogs’; the lexical entry for boil says that it refers to ‘boiling’; and so
forth.” Hence, the valid inferences that obtain from lexical items should be attributed to general knowledge
rather than to the meaning of the lexical item in question.
Alfa, São Paulo, 51 (2): 165-187, 2007174
Centrality is seen as a complex notion, not necessarily linked to the fact that an
aspect of meaning is a necessary condition.
A more elaborated model along these lines is found in Evans (2006).
According to Evans, there is a distinction between lexical concepts, which are
of linguistic a nature, and cognitive models, which would correspond to the
“semantic potential that lexical concepts provide access to” (EVANS, 2006, p.496),
roughly, encyclopaedic knowledge. Evans argues that meaning construction is
a function of language use which arises through the use of lexical concepts in
particular communicative situations. In turn, and clearly in line with Langacker’s
observation above, lexical concepts are “abstractions which language users
derive from conceptions” (i.e. constructed meaning). Evans’s distinction between
lexical knowledge and the encyclopaedia seems to make his thesis incompatible
with the allegedly gradual relation between the lexicon and the encyclopedia
that cognitive grammarians defend. However, what is relevant in his approach
is that conventional lexical meaning is not assumed to be rigid or based upon
necessary and sufficient conditions.
Just like Langacker, Marconi (1997, p.41) claims that some of the features
associated with a lexical concept are more likely to be considered linguistic;
these include necessary and universal specifications, and those which can be
taken as constitutive of normal competence by the members of a linguistic
community. Crucially, he explicitly denies that lexical knowledge could be
equated with the encyclopedia.
Of course, the problem with these notions is that they can offer contradictory
results for a given specification. Let us take our previous example again: the
feature ‘mammal‘ in the meaning of  ‘dog‘. Undoubtedly, this is both a necessary
and universal feature, as it applies to all dogs, but is it constitutive of normal
competence? Note that it may not be available to those speakers who have not
had the opportunity of receiving primary education. Compare it with the
specification ‘it has four legs‘. This is an observable piece of knowledge probably
available to all speakers and clearly constitutive of normal competence. But is it
a necessary feature? Not really, as there can be dogs with just three legs.
However, what is undeniable is that there cannot be dogs which are not
mammals.
This means that it is rather difficult to determine the set of features which
can characterize the collective meaning of a given lexeme. Marconi (1997, p.52-53)
expresses this neatly:
two (or more) speakers may be said to share a common language, in
the ordinary sense of that phrase, even though they only share some
beliefs (…) at the lexical level, individual competence does not
Alfa, São Paulo, 51 (2): 165-187, 2007 175
coincide with encyclopedic knowledge, that is, with the totality of
true beliefs that can be ascribed to the linguistic community as a
collective entity (…) it is extremely hard to isolate a plausible subset
of encyclopaedic knowledge as being constitutive of (lexical) semantic
competence, that is, a set of propositions we all ought to know or
belief in order to be regarded as lexically competent. As a matter of
fact, each of us knows or believes partly different things (partly
different subsets of the collective encyclopedia), yet we are all
competent in the use of our language (…) We ought to speak not of a
unique lexical competence, only of individual competences. In this
sense, there is no language, only idiolects.
The question is then, how do we account for inter-human communication if
individual competences are so varied? An answer immediately suggests itself
if, again, we replace the notion lexical meaning with lexical competence,
understood as the ability to use words in efficient communication. A speaker
need not possess a ‘perfect‘ definition of a word to be able to communicate
efficiently. As long as speakers share a number of beliefs about concepts, they
can be said to communicate.7 And, as we well know, communication emerges
out of intentions and, by default, users talk to communicate with others.
Therefore, many differences in lexical competence across speakers go unnoticed
as long as communication is not disrupted. If disruption does take place,
discourse might need meta-linguistic repair.
So, speakers need not possess an optimal definition of a concept, not even
share the same set of beliefs about a concept. All they need is, in the words of
Marconi, to converge on a number of beliefs for communication to take place.
My personal interpretation of the notion converge is a dynamic one. Speakers
converge on meanings dynamically, on line. They may adapt their own beliefs
on the basis of the contextual information available, and thus modify their
previous ideas on concepts. Thus meaning is not merely conveyed, it is
constructed cooperatively (EVANS, 2006). But this does not mean that two
speakers possess exactly the same concept a priori. And from this, it also follows
that there are no beliefs that are necessarily shared by all competent users. It is
enlightening, however, that both Langacker and Marconi agree that being
conventional or constitutive or normal competence is a crucial criterion for a
feature to be considered central in the meaning of a lexeme, a notion which fits
extremely well in a usage-based theory of meaning.
An important consequence of this approach is the flexibility which is
attributed to lexical meaning. Thus, it is possible for a given feature to evolve
form being contingent or necessary to being constitutive of normal competence
7 Of course, the nature of those beliefs is crucial in the approach defended here. As a matter of fact, characterizing
speakers’ lexical competence is the objective of a research project at the University of Oviedo. At the moment,
different and rather exhaustive lexical tests have been applied to 36 Spanish native speakers of different age
and education. We hope to provide reports on the results of this project in future work.
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and therefore central. Lexical meaning is understood as a dynamic entity, subject
to revisions, extensions or adaptations both in context and through time.
Secondly, given that the features associated with lexical concepts are in
principle open-ended, different aspects of meaning may be highlighted in
particular communicative situations. This is what happens in the process called
modulation of senses (CRUSE, 1986). Consider the following examples (adapted
from CRUSE, 1986, p.53):
(2) a. Sue is visiting her cousin
b. Sue is visiting her pregnant cousin
In (2a), cousin is general with respect to the distinction male or female. This
distinction is neutralized in (2b) where the only possible interpretation is ‘female‘
cousin. Hence, the context crucially contributes to selecting/adding one
particular trait of meaning under the shared belief that only female human beings
can be pregnant. Consider the following examples, also taken from Cruse (1986):
(3) a. The car needs servicing
b. The car needs washing
c. We can’t afford that car
d. Our car couldn’t keep up with his
In (3a) and (3b) ‘car‘ highlights different parts of the car, whereas in (3c) and (3d)
it is general attributes, the prize and the performance, that are brought to the
fore. These interpretations are difficult to explain if one does not assume that
certain features (the fact that cars are sold and have a prize or the fact that cars
have differences in performance, etc.) are part of speakers’ normal lexical
competence. They are also difficult to explain in a model claiming that lexical
entries are complex bundles which are retrieved in utterances in toto.8
Again, it could be argued that modulation of senses or meaning creation in
context is a matter of language use which can be accounted for in a theory of
meaning which assumes fixed definitions for lexical items. Indeed, the core
meanings of cousin in (2) and car in (3) may be reasonably argued to have
remained unaltered and only further constricted in each context. While this
may be true from a comprehension perspective, I would think that in the
production process speakers select or highlight the relevant meaning
specifications from the set associated to a given lexeme in the construction of
the message content they wish to convey.
In the following section I will examine the implications of this approach for
the selection of lexical items and the start of the formulation process in FDG. As
8 As I also show in García Velasco (Forthcoming), this system allows for a proper treatment of conversion
(zero-derivation) phenomena in English.
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the standard view in the theory makes use of decompositional definitions, it
will be necessary to propose an alternative approach with, possibly, significant
consequences for the overall organization of the model. By examining the influence
of general knowledge in the linguistic generation process I will also show that
this conception of lexical competence is preferable to an approach which rests
on the separation between linguistic and communicative competence.
3 Implications for FDG
As mentioned in the preceding section standard FG has characterized lexical
meaning in accordance with the classical view, accepting the possibility that
necessary and sufficient features can be identified and that they constitute the
meaning of lexical items. Dik accepted Carnap’s meaning postulates as an
adequate way of formalizing this intuition. Moreover, since he assumed that
defining language is “a language-internal affair”, he rejected the possibility of
including general knowledge as part of speakers’ lexical competence.
The view that I have defended here, however, suggests that lexical meaning
is conventional information associated to lexical items, and rejects the possibility
of proposing static definitions for lexical items. Individual competences are varied
and the meaning of lexical items is flexible and can be adapted in context and
modified through time. FDG, the successor of Dik’s FG, has not been very explicit
in its treatment of the lexicon component and the exact role it has in the grammar,
but certain crucial differences in its organization with respect to classical FG
are obvious and merit some discussion.
First, unlike FG, FDG is a top-down grammatical model which takes the
discourse act, rather than the sentence, as the basic unit of linguistic analysis.
The theory is strongly inspired by Levelt’s (1989) model of language production,
which runs from the speaker’s communicative intention to its encoding in an
adequate linguistic expression in the target language.9 Levelt’s model of the
speaker comprises three different components: a Conceptualizer, a Formulator
and an Articulator. Conceptualizing involves creating a communicative intention
and constructing a preverbal message: a conceptual structure that will serve as
input to the Formulator. The process of Formulation translates this preverbal
conceptual structure into a linguistic structure (LEVELT 1989, p.11). Finally,
Articulating involves executing an acoustic plan by means of the relevant
physiological organs.10
9 See Butler (Forthcoming) for a careful comparison of Levelt’s model and FDG.
10 In FDG, as a model of the natural language user rather than a model of the speaker, articulating involves
expressing the output of the grammar component according to the medium chosen (written output, acoustic
output, etc.).
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The process of Formulation is fed by a set of primitives, including frames,
lexemes and primary operators. Frames and Lexemes are the result of García
Velasco and Hengeveld’s (2002) proposal to separate lexemes from argument
structures. These authors suggest that the notion of predicate frame in FG should
be replaced by a combination of predication frames on the one hand, lexemes
provided with abstract meaning definitions on the other, and a linking mechanism
joining them together. The linking mechanism is sensitive to the number of entities
present in the abstract meaning definition which, in the default case, will have to
be projected onto syntax. By way of illustration, the authors examine a simple
case of linking. They propose the following definition for the lexeme open:
(4) open [V]
[f1: [CAUSE (x1) [BECOME open’ (x2)]]]
This entry states that open designates a relation (as represented by the ‘f‘
variable) between two entities (as represented by the ‘x‘ variables). The presence
of these variables guides the linking process towards the selection of a transitive
predication frame. Predication frames are assumed to define basic syntactic
environments for the insertion of lexemes. Thus, the following is the predication
frame for the lexeme open in its transitive use:
(5) (π e1: [(f1: open (f1)) (x1)Ag (x1)Pat] (e1))
One of the obvious consequences of this proposal is that the number of
arguments of a given lexical item and their semantic functions can be obtained
from the abstract meaning definitions in an on-line fashion. What is more, the
system allows the same lexeme to choose different frames, thus offering a new
scenario in which to treat syntactic alternations.
This approach fits in nicely with Levelt’s model. According to Levelt (1989,
p.73), preverbal messages must be constructed on the basis of some propositional
language of thought in such a way that they meet the conditions required to be
expressible in human language. Lexical selection relies on the existence of a
match between the conceptual preverbal message and the conceptual
specifications of a given lexical item. If that is the case, the relevant lexeme will
be retrieved and will trigger the process of grammatical encoding (see LEVELT,
1989, chapter 7). Given the fact that lexical definitions are usually constructed
on the basis of decomposition models of lexical meaning and preverbal messages
are assumed to be made of similar constructs, the process of lexical selection is
thus easily solved.11
11 According to Bierwish and Schreuder (1992, p.28), lexical decomposition is needed to account for lexical
access. At the same time, decomposition models are also useful to link the lexicon with the syntactic system
and select syntactic configurations. Hence, all in all, decomposition is useful from a grammar designing
perspective and one might even think that its defense relies mostly on theoretical convenience.
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In the preceding section, however, I have argued that definitions based on
necessary and sufficient features are not valid structures to represent speakers’
lexical competence; therefore, the FDG approach just sketched does not seem
to be in accordance with the observations on lexical competence presented in
the previous sections. In particular, definitions such as (4) should be modified or
replaced with structures compatible with the view on lexical meaning here
defended. Obviously, this move will also have consequences for the process of
lexical selection and the linking between the lexicon and syntax.
Although certain modifications will be necessary, the FDG organization offers
a simple solution to the linking issue even if decompositional definitions are
dispensed with. Assuming that predication frames (containing the qualitative
and the quantitative valency of the lexemes in the language) belong to the
primitive inventory of the grammar, there is no need for the system to extract
this information from the definitions themselves. Speakers will select a relevant
frame on the basis of the specifications or beliefs associated to a lexical item,
but the syntactically relevant information will only be present in the frame
chosen.
In the preceding section I argued that the meaning of lexical items should
be seen as sets of beliefs conventionally attached to lexical items by the members
of a linguistic community. I also assumed, following Marconi, that it is not possible
to isolate the specific set of beliefs which are shared by all speakers for a given
item. Bearing this in mind, the semantic side of a lexical entry should thus be
seen as an idealized representation of that partially common knowledge. Let us
illustrate the mechanism with an example.
The lexeme ‘open’ might be linked to the following pieces of information
which could be assumed to be part of normal competence:
(6) Open:
a. Opening is an event.
b. By opening somebody allows entrance of something.
c. Tins, doors, etc. can be opened.
d. People open doors to enter buildings.
etc.
The representation in (6) states the following: any competent speaker should
‘know‘ that the item ‘open‘ denotes an event (6a). I would assume, therefore,
that lexemes are characterized in the lexicon by competent speakers as ‘event-
denoting‘, ‘thing-denoting‘, ‘property-denoting‘, etc., as a basic feature. Secondly,
speakers should have an intuition of the number of participants typically involved
in the bringing about of the event (6b-c). Finally, speakers will have a variable
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number of specifications of pragmatic nature which may even relate to their
own private experience.
Assuming that (6a-b) are the minimum required to be competent in the use
of this lexeme, speakers will have everything necessary for the selection of a
predication frame. First, the fact that ‘open‘ is characterized as an event will
guide towards the selection of an eventive frame. The fact that participants will
be coded as agents, patients or processed entities is part of the grammar of the
relevant languages and should not be included in the lexical entry. All that is
needed is a representation of the action of ‘opening‘ either in propositional format
as in (6b) or in referential format (i.e. images, 3D representations, etc.). The system
also allows new specifications from the conceptual component to enter the
characterization of the item. Lexical meaning is thus flexible, it can be adapted
in context, and parts of it may be highlighted in a specific discourse act.
One important advantage of this model is that it explains how conceptual
specifications may influence the selection of predication frames. It is usually
assumed that the semantic representations of linguistic expressions are
embeddable into wider conceptual structures so that they can be interpreted
(BIERWISH; SCHREUDER, 1992, p.33). In other words, linguistic units convey
meaning which is further interpreted on the basis of the information provided
by speakers’ general knowledge and the particulars of the communicative
situation. As mentioned earlier, this position may be related to the distinction
between grammatical and pragmatic competence.
However, what authors tend to forget is the fact that general knowledge
may have consequences not only for the interpretation of expressions in context
but also for the generation of linguistic expressions in very specific ways. I
mentioned before that referential knowledge may influence syntactic behaviour.
Jackendoff argues that verbs in the same semantic domain are only distinguished
through a 3D model with no syntactic consequences. Taylor (1996) explicitly
argues against this view by showing that there are important differences in
meaning between verbs such as jog and run that one cannot capture in a 3D
perceptual format. In particular, he claims that the activity of jogging is
characterized against the convention of a certain first-world society lifestyle
emphasizing health and fitness. Although jogging may be considered a type of
running, the two verbs are not interchangeable in all syntactic contexts, showing
the relevance of the different conceptual nature of both activities. Consider the
following contrasts:
(7) a. Bruce ran against Phil
b. * Bruce jogged against Phil
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(8) a. He ran to get to the airport
b. * He jogged to get to the airport
(9) a. He ran away from the police
b. * He jogged away from the police
According to Taylor, the ungrammaticality of the ‘jog‘ expressions relates
to the nature of the activity of jogging as opposed to running. Jogging cannot
be conceived as a competitive activity, as in (7b), and its purpose is not to arrive
quickly at a specific destination, as in (8b), or to move away from a given position,
as in (9b). The pragmatics of jogging, then, has an influence on its syntactic
behaviour and should be part of the meaning associated with this lexeme. This
observation is a problem for lexical representations which only include those
aspects of the meaning of lexical items that are relevant to syntax.
Even syntactic alternations may be motivated by aspects of pragmatic
knowledge associated with lexical concepts. Let us illustrate this with the so
called causative alternation. As is well-known, there are significant differences
among verb classes with respect to the possibility of participating in the
alternation: manner-of-cutting verbs do not seem to admit the alternation, unlike
change-of-state verbs such as break, as shown in (10) and (11) respectively:
(10) a. Margaret cut the bread
b. * The bread cut
(11) a. Margaret broke the window
b. The window broke
The problem thus lies in determining the factors which forbid the application
of the process in one lexical class and allow it in another. Within Generative
Grammar, Levin and Rappaport (1994) have tried to identify such a property in
their analysis of this alternation. Summarizing their conclusions, it is possible to
say that the feature which the verbs participating in the construction share
centres on the nature of the instigator of the process. The authors assume that
those intransitive verbs which participate in the alternation denote events which
are externally caused, whereas those intransitive verbs which do not are
internally caused. Levin and Rappaport (1994, p.49-50) explain these notions in
the following way:
With an intransitive verb denoting an internally caused eventuality,
some property inherent to the argument of the verb is ‘responsible’
for bringing about the eventuality. (...) In contrast to internally caused
verbs, verbs which are externally caused inherently imply the
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existence of an external cause with immediate control over bringing
about the eventuality denoted by the verb: an agent, an instrument,
a natural force, or a circumstance. Thus something breaks because of
the existence of some external cause; something does not break solely
because of its own properties. Some of these verbs can be used
intransitively without the expression of an external cause, but, even
when no cause is specified, our knowledge of the world tells us that
the eventuality these verbs denote could not have happened without
an external cause. (emphasis mine)
This explains why internally caused verbs such as verbs of ‘emission’ cannot
participate in the alternation:
(12) a. *The jeweller sparkled the diamond
b. *Max glowed Jenny’s face with excitement
c. *We buzzed the bee when we frightened it
According to the authors, those transitive verbs which accept an intransitive
variant denote an event which can occur without the intentional intervention
of an agent. It is common, therefore, that these verbs may take Forces or
Instruments as subjects:
(13) The wind/the key opened the door
However, transitive verbs which require a volitional subject do not take
part in the alternation:
(14) a. *The candidate assassinated/murdered
b. *The letter wrote
c. *The house built
As expected, they do not readily accept the presence of an Instrument or
Force in subject position:
(15) a. *The knife assassinated/murdered the candidate
b. *The pen wrote the letter
c. ?? The crane built the house
As Levin and Rappaport (1994) suggest, it is our knowledge of the world
that tells us when the alternation can be applied. Given its cognitive-pragmatic
nature, this alternation can be handled in a much more natural way with an
approach to lexical meaning in which pragmatic specifications can be attached
to the semantics of lexical items.
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Even more crucially, speakers may interpret an internally caused verb as
externally caused. Take the verb disappear in Spanish. This is, as in English, an
intransitive verb which does not allow a causative interpretation:
(16) a. El coche desapareció
The car disappear.PAST
‘The car disappeared’
b. * Pepe desapareció el coche
Pepe disappear.PAST the car
‘Pepe made the car dissappear’
Yet, for some speakers in certain varieties of Spanish, in particular in the
geographical area where I was born, (16b) is possible. A similar situation arises
in the following expressions (attributed in Radford (1997, p.420) to Melissa
Bowerman) which illustrate common errors produced by children in their use of
verbs:
(17) a. Can I glow him? = ‘make him glow’
b. It stirs around = ‘the ice tea swirls around’
c. Larry knocked down = ‘Larry fell down’
Since we cannot assume that children have obtained these forms from their
caregivers, we need a system which allows verbs to be used in different syntactic
contexts until the correct conventional use of the relevant verb is learnt.
All this shows that general information is not only needed to interpret
linguistic expressions, but also to produce them. Within FDG (and any other
theory of language), therefore, room must be made to account for the relation
between lexemes and pragmatic features associated to lexical concepts which
are part of long-term information, but which can clearly influence the choice of
a specific predication frame. Lexical meaning, both referential and inferential, is
based on speakers’ shared beliefs on the nature of concepts. Basic specifications,
such as the fact that a given lexical item denotes an event or a thing should
obviously be considered linguistic, but the item should also be directly connected
to the conceptual component, which provides specifications subject to revisions
or validations. To the extent these specifications become conventional (in the
sense of constitutive of normal competence) they will become part of the
linguistic system. Thus, there are no lexical entries in the traditional sense, but
rather, correspondences between conceptual information, i.e. specifications or
properties we conventionally apply to concepts, and linguistic primitives used
in the construction of linguistic expressions. Of course, each speaker will have
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certain values associated to a lexical item, but they may be revised or adapted
on the basis of the information in the conceptual component and the needs of
convergence in communication. Given the inherent fragmentary nature of lexical
knowledge, then, an upsetting conclusion of this approach is that the lexicon
component, by its very nature, resists a uniform and elegant characterization in
a formal system of representation. To cite Marconi again, that would only be the
representation of one speaker’s idiolect.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the treatment of the lexicon component in
FDG should rely on different principles than those usually assumed in
grammatical theory. It should be noted that the shortcomings detected in the
treatment of lexical knowledge in contemporary linguistics are not exclusive to
FDG. Quite on the contrary, they are common to most grammatical models, but
they probably have more serious methodological consequences for functional
models of language. Formal models have avoided most of the problems detected
here by putting them aside of linguistics proper through the well-known
distinction between competence and performance. Unfortunately, this approach
may have been unconsciously inherited by functional theories, which employ
similar strategies in the characterization of lexical meaning. I hope to have shown
that studying lexical knowledge from the point of view of communicative
competence shows quite a different picture with significant implications for
the organization of linguistic models.
In particular, I have proposed that decompositional models do not capture
lexical competence adequately and they should be replaced by specifications
or beliefs which permit a more flexible treatment of lexical knowledge and
behaviour. I have also shown that this move does not require the introduction
of additional machinery into the theory, but just the assumption of a more
intimate relation between the lexicon component and the conceptual
component.
Of course, I am well aware that the issues discussed in this paper are of
such a serious nature and have such profound implications that my exposition
may have been too superficial at times. I do hope, however, that these
observations may serve to stimulate a necessary discussion on the role and
organization of the lexicon component in FDG.
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• RESUMO: Este artigo discute o papel do componente lexical na Gramática Discursivo-
Funcional. Argumenta-se que o tratamento do significado lexical na maioria dos modelos
gramaticais é inadequado. Propõe-se uma análise alternativa baseada na noção de
competência lexical de Marconi (1997), de acordo com a qual o significado lexical
compreende duas dimensões diferentes: conhecimento referencial e inferencial.
Argumenta-se a seguir que modelos decomposicionais de significado lexical não captam
realmente o conhecimento inferencial do falante, da mesma forma que é questionável a
noção de que possuem definições detalhadas e semelhantes para a maioria dos itens
lexicais. Os falantes associam crenças e especificações a itens lexicais e a comunicação
emerge quando tais crenças convergem dinamicamente em interação verbal. Por fim, as
implicações dessa análise para a GDF são examinadas. Sugere-se que definições com
significado abstrato não são realmente necessárias para o modelo e que o léxico deveria
estar em contato estreito com o componente conceptual.
• PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Gramática Discursivo-Funcional; competência lexical; léxico;
componente conceptual.
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